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In 1964, Kurt Martin took the initiative, with John Knapp, in 
organizing a conference at Manchester on the ‘Teaching of Develop­
ment Economics: Its Position in the Present State o f  Knowledge’, 
and subsequently edited the conference proceedings under the same 
title (Frank Cass 1967). The conference was called because (as the 
jacket said) a feeling had grown ‘that current, orthodox economic 
theory is inadequate in this field’.
The conference was lively. This was really the first major public 
celebration of  such misgivings, and it was a landmark in the evolu­
tion of  both the subject and its teaching. I shall argue that the 
heuristic problems raised are still with us today, and discuss some 
lines of solution which were aired then. But in order to show why 
‘development economics’ took the shape it did, and why this per­
sists today, one has to go back to its origins.
We tend to forget how recent a subject it is, only having started 
life in the 1950s. The parent was colonial economics, which catered 
mainly for those working in, or hoping to enter, the colonial ser­
vices. In retrospect, the world assumed in these courses was essen­
tially static. A basic problem was trade fluctuation which had been 
characteristic of the inter-war years. The main objective, implicitly 
at least, was stabilization. This reflected both the needs of the col­
onial powers (especially those with interests in Africa, where com-
*1 am very grateful for comments from two experienced teachers and researchers in 
this field, Pramit Chaudhuri o f  the University o f  Sussex and Gerald Helleiner o f  the 
University o f  Toronto.
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modity exports were important) and the Keynesian fashion then 
current. Inasfar as social and political change was considered, it 
was depicted as gradual progress requiring economic stability. The 
economic role of the state was very limited.
The war not only disrupted the colonial systems: it upset this way 
o f perceiving problems. The newly-independent governments that 
emerged subsequently were under pressure to produce ‘develop­
m ent’, not stability. The wartime success o f  the Soviet Union, then 
at the height of its international power and prestige, was inter­
preted as implying that purposive development of a very backward 
economy was by no means impossible. The United Nations which 
had just been born, provided a forum in which these governments 
were starting to press their claims collectively.
From the viewpoint of the governments of the major capitalist 
countries, there was grave danger that ex-colonial countries might, 
if there was little social progress, fall under Communist dom ina­
tion: then investment opportunities and access to markets and 
sources of raw materials would be diminished. In addition, 
egalitarian and humanitarian tendencies had been reinforced by 
wartime propaganda.
A political basis thus emerged in the early 1950s for large-scale 
financial and technical aid. Many economists in Europe and North 
America began to fashion tools for analyzing the problems of 
‘underdevelopment’. A seminal work on which they could draw 
was Kurt M artin’s The Industrialisation o f  Backward Areas,' 
showing what resources industrial development would need. By 
focussing on South-East Europe, this book also helped establish a 
wider geographical coverage than just the colonial empires.
So the pedigree of Development Economics reads ‘By Colonial 
Economics out of Political Expediency’. After the usual academic 
inertia, university courses previously called ‘colonial economics’ 
came to include one or more units on ‘planning’ (sometimes con­
stituting the whole course).2 This was fashionable in newly- 
independent countries, and the need for it was accepted, more or 
less reluctantly, by those responsible for external policy in the 
United States and Western Europe. Even in the capitalist world, 
planning had contributed to winning the war. However, laissez- 
fa ire  influences were still strong3 and this ambiguous word often 
meant little more than the construction of hypothetical projections; 
the implicit role of the state was still usually not very great.
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How much use such courses have been is questionable. They 
tended to develop a focus which seems less convincing now than it 
did in the 1950s. Development became increasingly identified with 
economic growth, as measured by the national income (defined ac­
cording to Keynesian conventions). There was a simplistic chain of 
reasoning. Did not the ‘developed’ countries, then seen as political 
and social models, have high per capita incomes? Was not, 
therefore, raising per capita incomes the condition for building 
political democracy and creating welfare states with a high level of 
employment — a necessary condition and by implication a suffi­
cient one? To raise income, capital was needed. There were natural­
ly political differences about how the capital could best be obtain­
ed, and what scope should be allowed market forces. But a general 
consensus existed, covering even Marxists, that higher incomes was 
the end and capital investment the means.
This way of looking at development was heavily reinforced by 
theoretical innovations in mainstream economics and associated 
ones in statistics. The H arrod-Dom ar identity ‘explained’ economic 
growth in terms of savings ratios and capital-output coefficients, 
making it possible to estimate the capital investment, and thus aid 
needs, for any target rate o f  growth.4 Subsequent developments in 
project evaluation enabled a simple (or simplistic) frame to be con­
structed for comparing the financial costs o f  a project with its ex­
pected contribution to the national income.
National income accounting was naturally stimulated, leading to 
a great proliferation of  economic statistics. While these numbers 
were useful for quantifying models, many of them had little factual 
basis, and they were in any case designed to fit accounting 
frameworks and concepts o f  ‘income’, ‘investment’, etc. devised 
for industrial countries.5
To understand why economists teaching development courses 
employed a theoretical framework which had been developed in a 
different context, and loaded it with largely meaningless numbers, 
one must look at professional convenience and career interests 
especially in the ‘developed’ countries, where most o f  the 
theoretical advances in the field originated.
The growth models that were fashionable there had a powerful 
intellectual appeal and provided welcome opportunities for a 
display of professional skills (e.g. in graduate theses), in ways that 
seemed socially relevant. The scientific and humanitarian preten­
sions of the discipline appeared to be simultaneously justified, in­
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creasing its capacity to attract research funds and its weight in 
academic politics.
Moreover, reducing the complexity of social change to a single 
yardstick eliminated a large number of issues — notably the 
distribution of the benefits of growth between different social 
classes, ethnic groups and regions. This made the models of very 
doubtful relevance in countries where these were precisely the key 
issues. But it kept them manageable and free of  factors to which 
economists were unaccustomed.
The focus on growth was also welcome to politicians in power, 
because these issues were potentially divisive. Moreover, the 
publication of technically sophisticated economic growth projec­
tions (called ‘development plans’) also formed a major political oc­
casion, celebrating an apparent dedication to development. They 
provided an apparently objective basis for aid requests, which was 
appreciated by (in some cases required by) donor agencies.
Still, it was already clear by the early 1960s that planning of 
growth was not as successful as had been hoped — the results of the 
Indian Five-Year Plans had been particularly disappointing (since 
they were of relatively good technical quality). Incremental capital- 
output ratios turned out to be too unstable to be used in planning, 
and in any case research on industrial countries showed that growth 
functions were incomplete if they made no provision for ‘technical 
change’.6
Rising professional doubts surfaced at Manchester.7 In their 
preface to the proceedings, the editors wrote ‘there was general if 
somewhat belated agreement at the Conference that differences in 
circumstances [their italics] may often call for significant depar­
tures from some of the factual assumptions habitually made in 
Anglo-Saxon economic theories, with corresponding changes both 
in the results o f  analysis and in its application in diagnosis and 
policy form ation .’
There was less agreement at Manchester on how much these dif­
ferences in circumstances mattered. In his personal contributions to 
the conference, Kurt Martin took an intermediate position. He 
followed E. E. Hagen and Hla Myint, who argued that despite the 
differences the central corpus of  economic doctrine was still rele­
vant, by urging the need to keep stressing ‘certain axioms or basic 
tools of economics’, instancing the concept o f  opportunity cost and 
the idea of a market (p. 146). On the other hand, he also felt that 
‘textbook economics does not take us very fa r ’ and that many con­
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ventional theorems needed reconsideration. And he doubted 
(p. 205) the practical usefulness in this field of advanced 
mathematical and econometric techniques. He described more 
down-to-earth, empirical case studies in the ‘w orkshop’ he had a 
big role in running, as part of the Manchester Diploma course.
Scepticism aired at this conference has proved fully justified. It 
was directed rather at the naive transfer of neo-classical economics 
in general than simply at one of its concepts, economic growth. 
Still, the question Paul Streeten raised then, under the heading 
‘false aggregation’ (pp. 60-62 and 67), foreshadowed later misgiv­
ings about growth: ‘The income of an industrial enclave may grow, 
while the real income per head of the indigenous population 
stagnates or declines. In what sense is “ average income” rising?’
At the risk of  labouring the obvious, let me briefly summarize 
the reason why economic growth has been discredited as a concept. 
After all, some people do actually still say that growth is necessary 
before  redistribution (‘one must first bake the cake’, etc.). But as 
we now well know, economic growth, however fast, has not been a 
sufficient condition for relieving social distress, still less for achiev­
ing political democracy. Its effects have depended on its pattern  — 
not only the sectoral but also geographical and (in some cases) 
ethnic balance; and the accompanying institutional changes — 
precisely the issues excluded from growth models. Moreover, the 
pattern has deterred the very possibility of redistribution: once an 
elite has been created it has held onto the levers of economic power.
Some types of fast growth have implied periodic political repres­
sion to keep exports competitive and to restrict the social distribu­
tion o f  benefits (e.g. Brazil, 1965 to the present); or they have been 
associated with rising unemployment and emigration (Jamaica and 
Puerto Rico throughout the post-war period being clear examples); 
or they have stimulated separatism (e.g. Pakistan, in the 1960s); or 
they have proved incompatible with national cultural traditions (as 
in Iran, 1952-78). Most patterns of  fast growth have also brought 
other consequences: increased political, economic and cultural 
dependence. These aspects of growth are all linked, in fact, where 
this consists essentially of foreign technology and capital being 
pumped into a limited ‘modern sector’.
It is no longer clear that economic growth is even positively cor­
related with development. Those who claim such a causal connec­
tion need to say what they include in development, then establish 
some association, and finally speculate on which is the causal fac­
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tor. Certainly, increases in some types of output (especially food) 
would cure poverty — one of the common aims of development. 
But, as Paul Streeton implied 15 years ago, these do not necessarily 
require high rates of growth in the heterogeneous conventional ag­
gregate known as the ‘national income’ — especially since output 
series for basic foods carry relatively low price weights in economic 
growth calculations. Indeed, in countries where the proximate 
cause o f  poverty is (for example) the concentration of health ser­
vices in the cities, the necessary steps to eliminate it would hardly be 
reflected in output statistics at all. To reduce dependence on im­
ported oil, another common aim of development, might actually 
mean negative growth.8
There are other reasons why ‘development planning’ has turned 
out to be something of a charade. Plans have very rarely contained 
any contingency provision to allow for changes in external cir­
cumstances (especially fluctuations in exports or import prices). 
Nor did the planners possess instruments to influence foreign in­
vestors, even in (the numerous) countries where they were responsi­
ble for key decisions on types of technology, direction of  trade, etc. 
But the main weakness is rarely even mentioned in courses in plan­
ning; politicians have never paid much more than lip service to it — 
few have been sufficiently dedicated even to economic growth ob­
jectives to keep in day-to-day contact with planning offices and pay 
heed to their advice. Planning requires as a first condition not a 
staff o f  economists trained in development economics, nor an in­
pu t/ou tpu t  table, but the will (as exists in wartime) to make all 
policy decisions consistent with ultimate goals.9
Development economics in the conventional sense has therefore 
proved much less useful than was expected in the vigorous op­
timism of its youth. In some circumstances, it may well have ag­
gravated social problems if only by diverting attention from their 
real causes — indeed from the problems themselves.
There are reasons to doubt whether it will survive much longer, 
indeed whether it can be considered a subject at all. In the first 
place, we all really know now that the economic aspects of the cen­
tral issues of  development cannot be studied or taught in isolation 
from other factors — social, political and cultural — a point made 
by many speakers at the Manchester conference, especially A. H. 
Hanson and Max Gluckman, but also Nicholas Kaldor.
It is now clear that macro-economic analysis o f  changes in the 
pattern of consumption, for example, will not go far unless it in-
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eludes a study of foreign cultural influences10 and of the 
mechanisms by which they are transmitted. A proper explanation 
of trends in the employment market involves, inter alia, looking at 
the sources of foreign technology, including educational institu­
tions.
Many course directors have tried to solve these problems by 
adopting an approach that one might call ‘development economics 
plus’, i.e. to teach a fundamentally economics course with occa­
sional reference to those non-economic factors that appear too im­
portant to omit. This in essence is what Kurt Martin advocated at 
the Manchester meeting and it has no doubt become increasingly 
common since then. But in the meantime we have also grown more 
aware of the complexity of  development. It is true that we still lack 
a credible framework of theory covering political, social and 
economic change (unless one were to believe in Marxism). Some of 
those at the Manchester conference doubted whether we should 
even look for such a framework — though its absence certainly 
helps explain the survival o f  uni-disciplinary courses.
One way of crossing disciplinary boundaries is to teach problem- 
oriented case studies (such as Kurt Martin was already using at 
Manchester in the early 1960s). These have also been used in the ex­
plicitly inter-disciplinary graduate courses which have relatively 
recently been created in Britain (and no doubt elsewhere): so have 
historical analyses which of  necessity cover various disciplines.11 It 
is early as yet to evaluate these courses, but hopefully they will 
throw light on how to tackle this problem.
There is a second major reason why development economics as 
usualy taught now lacks rationale. Its syllabus — indeed its very ti­
tle — suggests that certain countries, i.e. those ‘underdeveloped’, 
have problems that require a special type of analysis. To insist on 
the ‘difference in circumstances’, i.e. that the industrial countries 
were a ‘special case’, seemed revolutionary to some in the 1960s. 
Indeed, it was then a step forward. It discouraged the naive transfer 
of neo-classical economics (including the Keynesian and Marxist 
versions) to continents for which they had not been designed.
However, at that same conference, some o f the speakers, e.g. 
Joan Robinson and Thomas Balogh, developed arguments which 
were really inconsistent (at least oh the surface) with emphasizing 
these differences. They ‘denied that conventional textbook analysis 
was relevant in Western countries’, to quote from the editors’ sum­
mary (p. xi). This denial seemed rather a diversion at the time but it
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looks much more cogent today. Others had questioned at Man­
chester whether one could make in Africa or Asia the necessary 
assumptions about homogeneous competitive markets for factors 
and products implicit in the use o f  neo-classical economics. But can 
we make these assumptions about any part of the world, especially 
today?
Virtually all countries are suffering now from structural rather 
than global problems. For very few would an acceleration of 
growth per se be a solution to social problems such as unemploy­
ment. All countries face powerful external forces, especially the 
policies of the transnational corporations, and experience the 
strains of absorbing modern technology. So insights from the 
development field could usefully be imported into the social 
sciences in the so-called developed countries too, which include 
several where neo-classical analysis and prescription did not once 
seem obviously implausible. I refer to appropriate technology and 
concepts familiar in Latin American writings, such as self-reliance, 
marginalization and cultural dependence.
There is no longer a clear frontier between North and South 
(referred to as East and West in the 1960s). This makes profes­
sionally less tenable what is ceasing diplomatically to be acceptable 
anyway, the paternalistic idea, common to both colonial and 
development economics, that officials should come to Europe from 
underdeveloped countries to hear how' we think they should plan 
their future.
The political basis for the old type of course has now largely 
eroded anyway. Capitalist governments, especially since the oil 
crisis o f  1973-74, no longer feel they have resources to spare for big 
aid programmes. Nor are they now so concerned about interna­
tional communism. This is partly because of  the wars and tensions 
between communist countries, and partly because it has become 
obvious that, whatever the ideology of a political leadership, it 
needs technology (and in most cases food) that can only be obtain­
ed from the capitalist countries. These importations can only be 
financed by sales in these same countries or loans from them (or 
from members of OPEC). Aid has ceased to be so important in 
quantitative terms or in qualitative relation to other international 
links, and the focus of  the international debate is now rather on 
‘mutuality’ of interest.
It is true that the governments of many ‘developing’ countries 
still find it tactically convenient to retain the fiction that there is an
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identifiable South. We are not, however, necessarily bound to 
shape professional categories so as to suit short-term political con­
venience. From a professional point of view, the time has come to 
emphasize similarities rather than differences in circumstances and 
to dispose of development economics. What will take its place? 
There is already a detectable trend towards courses which are not 
only interdisciplinary but study development as a universal p ro­
blem and draw much of their material from the host country (which 
provides of course almost the only feasible possibility of field work 
on case studies).
They increasingly contain a mixture of students from both 
‘N orth ’ and ‘South’ (and in some cases also a similar mixture of 
staff)- The needs of  European students can only be catered for in 
a ‘development’ context. It is becoming apparent, for example, that 
a national government, in Europe as elsewhere, or a corporation, 
or an agency like EEC, needs social scientists with an understan­
ding of the world as a whole; of the changing role of their continent 
in it; of population, energy and food problems; and of the 
significance of a country’s size, location and resource base for its 
development options. A graduate student in Britain, for example, 
is not really prepared for many subsequent careers if he does not 
acquire an appreciation of the country’s historical decline in 
technological leadership and competitiveness: a Scottish student 
needs in addition some insight into the reasons for the depopula­
tion of the Highlands and also (for somewhat different reasons) 
Clydeside — and of parallels and contrasts with the depopulation 
of other peripheral regions.
The big European centres like ISS, IEDES and IDS, that have 
played a major part in teaching ‘development economics’ to 
foreign students, are the logical centres for initiating the shift to a 
new approach (as is in fact already taking place). They are the 
bridges across,which development concepts could be imported into 
European universities, stimulating research on European problems 
within a developmental frame of analysis. Such an approach puts 
greater pressure on those planning graduate courses, especially 
those with students from more than one country. Already in 1964, 
Kurt Martin was arguing (p. 205) that courses like the Manchester 
Diploma could not be taught in less than two years. Still more 
ground needs to be covered now, not only because the horizons of 
‘development’ have been greatly extended, but also because most 
students start by knowing very little about (say) the world food
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market or the social costs and benefits o f  different types of  energy 
or the trajectory of policy in China. A bigger gap needs filling.
This is largely due to the nature of  undergraduate syllabi, which 
still consist in large part o f  a priori unidisciplinary techniques. It is 
true that many now include part-time, optional courses, lasting 
three terms at most, in some subject such as ‘The Economic P ro ­
blems of Developing Countries’. This academic isolation of part of 
the world itself warps the student’s frame of perception. But in ad­
dition, to deal with development problems adequately in such a 
short time is almost impossible, especially in the absence of com­
plementary material in the rest of the undergraduate syllabus.
Such deficiencies would be less serious in their implications 
(which of course extend far beyond effects on graduate schools) if 
schools supplied their pupils with even a basic understanding of the 
modern world and of their country’s role in it. In Britain, at least, 
this is ruled out for the great majority of students by specialization, 
which ends the study of geography and history in the early teens.
We have to seek the explanation for these archaic syllabi, at all 
levels, in the bygone era when European industrial countries were 
sufficiently strong for the international context of policy to be 
largely irrelevant. It also lies in educational inertia, the unwill­
ingness to write off  obsolete texts and lecture notes.
One way of  rationalizing inertia in university economics courses 
is to argue that emphasis on empirical knowledge is too ‘descrip­
tive’: it would not teach a student ‘how to th ink’, a preoccupation 
o f  some at Manchester. In fact, this approach need not rule out im­
parting mathematical technique, e.g. in demographic analyses. But 
when put forward as a general way of tackling problems, especially 
those that are macro-economic, this is dangerous — as Kurt Martin 
mentioned. Today’s graduate students in mainstream economics 
are trained to ‘reduce’ reality to the limited set o f  quantifiable 
variables required not by the problem but by an elegant technique, 
a brutally technocratic approach.
The air of much of today’s economics is almost as rarified as in 
the theological schools of the Middle Ages. It could suffer from an 
increasingly obvious failure to provide answers to social problems, 
notably unemployment. The chief requirement in ‘thinking’ today 
is surely not to indulge in set gymnastic exercises, but to analyse ac­
tual problems in their historical and geographical complexity, tak­
ing account of  data limitations, adapting the techniques and con­
cepts as need be. This can be taught — though to do so demands
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greater skill and more time than demonstrating how to manipulate 
algebra.
Naturally, those who have mastered arcane mysteries try to insist 
on their importance, especially in the job market. But some signs of 
frustration among faculty and students are evidenced by interest in 
the ecological costs o f  economic growth and in dependence theory. 
There is a sort of dualism in economics, analogous to what can be 
found in nations, which involves two technologies, one inap­
propriately sophisticated.12
The history of  economic thought shows that, in the end, irrele­
vant theoretical frameworks are discarded. The logical future today 
is the study and teaching of development in a social and political as 
well as economic sense, with a wider geographical coverage and 
special emphasis on European development needs. In the retrospec­
tive perception o f  the twenty-first century, development economics 
may perhaps be seen as a transitional stage in the metamorphosis — 
and the Manchester conference of  1964 will appear as signalling the 
start of its death throes and the conception of  its successor.
•  NOTES
1. Oxford Institute o f Statistics Monograph No. 2 (Blackwell 1945).
2. Many o f  those at the Manchester conference had taught both ‘colonial’ and 
‘developm ent’ econom ics, notably Peter Ady, who provided a thoughtful paper on 
what parts o f mainstream econom ics were relevant.
3. Indeed, a purist group, critical o f  all forms o f  state intervention, persisted in 
development studies. A conspicuous example was the Chicago connection at the 
Catholic University in Santiago, under the influences o f Simon Rottenburg, A1 
Harberger and others: its graduates are now responsible for the laissez-faire 
econom ic policy o f  the Pinochet regime.
4. We sometimes forget that Roy Harrod was primarily concerned with 
something else, examining the instability and inefficiency inherent in capitalism, and 
consequent deviations from the ‘natural’ rate o f growth. If this strand o f his work 
had been followed up by development econom ists, it would have been fruitful. (This 
point was suggested in the comments o f  Pramit Chaudhuri.)
5. See ‘The Political Economy o f  National Accounting’, by Dudley Seers in 
Cairncross and Puri (eds.), Em ploym ent, Income D istribution and D evelopm ent 
Strategy: Essays in honour o f  Hans Singer (Macmillan 1976). Indeed, in any 
economy which is predominantly rural (i.e. typical) a competent statistician can pro­
duce almost any growth rate, even keeping strictly to the conventions o f  the UN
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System o f National Accounts. Since the monetization of existing activity appears as 
additional output (e.g. the conversion o f  traditional village administration, healing, 
education, entertainment, etc. into salaried activities, not to speak o f the increasing 
commercialization o f  the peasant household’s primary and secondary production), 
high rates are particularly easy to obtain. (For the same reason, most published 
estimates have an upward bias.)
6. This was widely interpreted as establishing the case for making specific provi­
sion for ‘human capital’, a factor in any case coming increasingly to the fore as 
African countries became independent. However, in the Manchester symposium, 
Thomas Balogh argued that it was fundamentally wrong to estimate a general ‘rate 
of return’ on education from such models.
7. Very similar doubts were also being expressed elsewhere, notably by Gunnar 
Myrdal then working on his Asian D ram a , though it was not published (by Allen 
Lane) until 1968. What Paul Streeten called ‘mumbles o f  discontent with established 
categories o f  thought’ had also been audible, in particular from Raul Prebisch and 
Latin American economists associated with him, but these were not taken very 
seriously by the profession, especially in that period.
8. Actually planning is not about growth in any real sense, but about changes in 
the estimated national income, mostly based, not on fact, but on hypotheses — for 
example that subsistence food output is a function o f  the assumed growth o f the 
rural population, or that output in the government sector increases in proportion to 
the number employed, irrespective o f what they do.
9. This is not to imply that an input/output table would be useless. Properly 
constructed, it could bring out som e  o f  the econom ic  consistency requirements.
10. Although this was denied by Professor Hagen at Manchester (p. 54) on the 
curious grounds that dependence o f this type required much face-to-face contact. 
Hagen spoke, however, strongly in favour o f  taking into account other social in­
fluences including one often mentioned in his work, a context favourable to 
‘creativity’.
11. O f course historians (who are also really development specialists) mostly lack 
an overarching framework o f  theory too.
12. This analogy was suggested by Gerry Helleiner.
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